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INTRODUCTION
The amount individuals spend on healthcare has increased
significantly over the past thirty years. In 2010, healthcare spending
was approximately one sixth of gross domestic product, and it is
expected to increase to one fifth of gross domestic product by 2021.1
Fixing America’s healthcare spending problems is vital for the
economy because these costs reduce business investment by placing
downward pressure on the consumption of other goods.2 To contain
healthcare costs and improve quality, Congress passed the Patient

 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.S., 2004, University of Virginia; B.A., 2003, Indiana University
Bloomington. The author would like to thank Professor Mary Rose Strubbe for her
mentorship.
1
Louise Radnofsy, Steep Rise in Health Costs Projected, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (July 12, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303768104577462731719000346
.html?KEYWORDS=medicare.
2
Christina D. Romer, Only the First Step in Containing Health Costs, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/business/health-care
-law-and-cost-containment-economic-view.html.
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010.3 Only the future
will determine whether the ACA effectively achieves these goals.
This Note discusses trends in hospital consolidation and its
influence on healthcare costs along with the impact that the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem
will have on healthcare spending in the private payor market. In
Messner, the Seventh Circuit certified a class action in which the
plaintiffs claimed that a Chicago area hospital network engaged in
anticompetitive practices, and in doing so, raised prices for private
payors.4 More specifically, the Note argues that the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) will
have a more prominent role in policing hospitals’ monopolistic
practices in light of (1) the ACA’s effects on consolidation in hospital
markets; (2) plaintiffs’ ability to survive Daubert challenges on
motions for class certification; (3) and trends in class action litigation.
Part I explains economic incentives and the effects of rapid
consolidation in the healthcare industry. Part II discusses the history of
antitrust enforcement actions and the legal issues that are unique to
hospital antitrust cases. Part III recounts Messner’s history from an
administrative action to a private class action, and Part IV explores
Messner’s deterrent effect, or lack thereof, on hospital anticompetitive
behavior.
I. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY &
RISING PRICES FOR PATIENTS
A. The Role of the Third Party Payor
The reasons for rising healthcare costs are as complex as the
industry itself. The asymmetry of information among the patients,
3

Ken Glazer & Catherine A. LaRose, Accountable Care Organizations:
Antitrust Business as Usual?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2011, at 1.
4
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012),
reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012), overruled sub nom. In re Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 268 F.R.D. 56 (N.D. Ill. April 12, 2010).
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providers, and payors that pervades the industry causes healthcare
delivery to be incredibly inefficient.5 In most markets for goods or
services, the customer pays the provider directly; however, in the
healthcare market a third party, such as the government or an
insurance company, generally pays for the patient’s healthcare.6 This
system is called the third party payor system, and it creates an
asymmetry of information between the patient, who depends on the
provider’s advice, and the provider, whom the third party pays.7
Because providers are paid for each procedure they perform and the
patient may never receive a bill, providers are tempted to prescribe
more services than may be necessary while guising these services as
beneficial to the patient.8 The troubling fact is that this system does
not necessarily create better outcomes for the patient, and it lacks selfcorrecting cost control mechanisms.9
In addition, rapid hospital consolidation is compounding the
healthcare spending problem, and this phenomena has been one of the
less publicized causes for increasing healthcare costs.10 Consolidation
has increased hospitals’ local market power, particularly when rival
hospitals, defined as hospitals located within seven miles of one
another, merge.11 This market power enables hospitals to raise prices
5

Len Nichols, Making Health Markets Work Better Though Targeted Doses of
Competition, Regulation, and Collaboration, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
7, 12–13 (2011).
6
In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007
WL 2286195, at *7 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Commission Decision].
7
Nichols, supra note 5, at 12–13.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 13.
10
Avik Roy, Hospital Monopolies: The Biggest Driver of Health Costs Nobody
Talks About, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/08/22/hospital-monopolies-the-biggestdriver-of-health-costs-that-nobody-talks-about/.
11
Avik Roy, Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, YOUTUBE (Nov.
18, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nq_gzO1pZ0&feature=player_embedded#! [hereinafter Hospital Consolidations and
Healthcare Costs].
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for private payors and order doctors to prescribe additional
unnecessary procedures while quality lags.12
Private insurers have ineffectively prevented hospitals’
monopolistic practices because they can spread these costs across their
networks, and they lack incentives to change their current contracting
processes. Instead of negotiating contracts with thousands of doctors
and hospitals individually to get the best prices, insurers prefer to set
price schedules sufficiently high to entice providers to participate in
their networks.13 Moreover, a patient who pays more for the
monopoly-priced services may not even be effected because that
patient’s co-pay can remain unchanged while the insurer raises
premiums or deductibles for participants within the insurer’s other
networks.14 These participants include employers that provide health
insurance for their employees and individuals who purchase health
plans for themselves.15 Employers can also pass the costs of more
expensive premiums onto employees in the form of reduced
compensation and benefits.16 This dynamic does not mitigate the
effects of hospital price increases; it simply enables insurers to spread
costs associated with monopoly pricing among their customers.17 In a
word, every insured person pays.
B. Bad Side Effects: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act &
Consolidation
To achieve the ACA’s goal of delivering better quality at lower
costs, the ACA promotes the formation of Accountable Care
12

Julie Creswell, A Hospital War Reflects a Bind for Doctors in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (November 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/business/ahospital-war-reflects-a-tightening-bind-for-doctorsnationwide.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.
13
Nichols, supra note 5, at 11; Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust
Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 681–82 (2010).
14
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at 7.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.

4
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Organizations (“ACOs”).18 ACOs are networks of hospitals and
doctors that take responsibility for specific Medicare patient
populations.19 The ACOs participate in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, which provides financial incentives to ACOs for reducing
healthcare costs.20 This new approach to care promotes the formation
of regional integrated networks21 that will inevitably serve patients
who are privately insured as well as Medicare patients.22 On a high
level, the ACA forces the hospital sector to pursue cost-efficiency
measures, which includes consolidating services and facilities and
clinical integration.23 However, a side effect of this integration is
consolidation, and the ACA has caused a frenzy of hospital mergers as
providers attempt to share savings and costs to cash in on incentives.24
For instance, in 2011, 301 hospital and clinic merger deals were
recorded, and healthcare deal volume is anticipated to remain active.25
The ACA has prompted both horizontal and vertical mergers as
well.26 Horizontal mergers include primary care networks and
hospitals buying out other hospitals to increase their geographic
footprints.27 Vertical consolidations include hospitals acquiring
18

Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/21health.html?pagewanted=all.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Andrew A. Kasper, Antitrust Review of Accountable Care
Organizations: An Assessment of FTC and DOJ's Relaxed Approach to Regulating
Physician-Hospital Networks, 90 N.C. L. REV. 203, 207 (2011) (noting antitrust
concerns can arise when ACO participants market their services to private payors).
23
M&A International Inc., Hospitals and Clinics M&A Outlook: What’s the
Prognosis for Deal Making?, M&A INTERNATIONAL, 6 (2012)
http://www.mergers.net/uploads/media/MAI_Healthcare.Report_2012.pdf
[hereinafter Hospitals and Clinics M&A Outlook].
24
Pear, supra note 18.
25
Hospitals and Clinics M&A Outlook, supra note 23, at 4.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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primary care facilities and insurers acquiring hospitals and primary
care service providers to diversify operations.28 Physician networks
control the flow of patients to hospitals, and these networks are vital to
making ACOs work by reducing readmissions.29 Therefore, hospitals
are seeking to acquire physician practices to strengthen their service
lines as opposed to building new practices.30
Hospital consolidations have both beneficial and detrimental
consequences. The benefits of consolidation include generating
operational efficiencies, which causes prices to decrease.31 These
efficiencies are particularly important for struggling hospitals that
need to realize savings to continue operations.32 Consolidation can
also help hospitals access the capital needed to make necessary
investments in healthcare technology and electronic medical records
systems.33 A significant detrimental effect of consolidation is that it
can increase hospital bargaining power, which enables hospitals to
raise prices even when the quality in healthcare delivery stagnates.34
With so many causes for skyrocketing healthcare costs,
determining whether consolidation has harmed or helped consumers is
difficult.35 Because of this problem, past studies were inconclusive as
to whether consolidation actually caused price increases.36 The lack of

28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Cory Capps & David Dranove, Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO
Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 23, no.2 (2004): 175–181, 175.
32
Toby Singer, Beth Heifetz & Tara Stuckey Morrissey, The Pro-Competitive
Benefits of Hospital Mergers, HOSPITAL & HEALTH NETWORKS (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.hhnmag.com/hhnmag/HHNDaily/HHNDailyDisplay.dhtml?id=3070004
128.
33
Id.
34
Creswell, supra note 12.
35
Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.
36
See Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger
Retrospective: A Review, 23–FALL ANTITRUST 34, 39–40 (2008) (citing three
separate studies of hospital mergers that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s
29
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evidence as to the effect of hospital consolidations is one reason for
the industry being highly concentrated today.37 More recently, post
merger reviews that use better methods have confirmed that hospital
consolidations contribute to price increases.38 For instance, a 2004
study on the changes in hospital prices before and after a hospital
merger found that consolidating hospitals tend to raise prices more
than the median price increases in a given market.39 The alarming fact
is that neither the FTC nor the DOJ challenged any of the mergers
analyzed in the 2004 study.40
Additionally, a hospital’s not-for-profit status is irrelevant in
predicting whether it will exploit its market power.41 Not-for-profit
hospitals are no more likely than for profit hospitals to increase
spending on charity care resulting from their ability to charge higher
prices.42 While true integration resulting from mergers can yield cost
savings, the evidence shows that these cost savings are not passed on

that yielded different results with respect to the mergers’ effects on pricing). See also
Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11.
37
Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11 (noting that
the first generation of hospital merger studies showed that hospital mergers had no
effect on prices).
38
Hospital Consolidations and Healthcare Costs, supra note 11; Dr. David
Dranove, Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization: Viewing Health Care
Consolidation through the Lens of the Economics of Strategy, 3, (March 2010),
available at,
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf
[hereinafter Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization] (citing a joint DOJ
and FTC study from 2004 as well as a study by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation from 2006 finding that consolidation enables hospitals to charge higher
prices).
39
Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 179.
40
Id. at 178, 180.
41
Martin Gaynor, Health Care Industry Consolidation: Facts, Impacts, and
Policy Options or “How do you Reform Health Care with an 800 Pound Gorilla in
the Room?” (Nov. 11, 2011), 18, 20, available at,
http://bakerinstitute.org/files/documents/event-presentations/hcreform2011/HPFevent-HCReformGaynorPresentation-111111.pdf/view?searchterm=gaynor.
42
Id. at 18, 20.

7
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to consumers,43 and the courts have only exacerbated the problem.
II. ANTITRUST LAW APPLIED IN HEALTHCARE
The last 20 years of antitrust hospital litigation has resulted in
varied outcomes.44 In the 1980s until the early 1990s, the FTC and
DOJ (collectively, the “Regulators”) successfully blocked every
anticompetitive hospital merger.45 However, starting in the mid-1990s
through 2001, the Regulators lost seven successive cases,46 and they
stopped opposing hospital mergers in spite of their concerns about the
mergers’ anticompetitive effects.47 These challenges to hospital
mergers were unsuccessful because the courts held that the hospitals’
geographic market definitions were too narrow,48 or the defendants
showed that the merger benefited consumers by exploiting
efficiencies.49 After these losses, the agencies focused their attention
on post-merger reviews.50 Due to mounting evidence of abuses of
market power, antitrust enforcement efforts are once again
intensifying.51

43

Id. at 19.
Toby G. Singer, Mergers: Antitrust Issues for Hospitals and Health Plans
Hospital Mergers, AHLA-PAPERS P06300812 (American Health Lawyers Ass’n
Seminar Materials, San Francisco, Cal.), June 30, 2008, at 24 [hereinafter AHLA
Seminar Papers].
45
Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.
46
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25.
47
Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.
48
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25.
49
Erica L. Rice, Note, Evanston’s Legacy: A Prescription for Addressing TwoStage Competition in Hospital Merger Antitrust Analysis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 431, 442
(2010).
50
Capps & Dranove, supra note 31, at 175.
51
Dr. David Dranove, Viewing Health Care Consolidation through the Lens of
the Economics of Strategy (Mar. 2010), 1, available at,
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/HCFOReportMarch2010.pdf.
44

8
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In most merger cases, the Regulators challenge mergers before
they are consummated.52 Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act, sizable firms that wish to merge must notify the
Regulators.53 The merger cannot be completed for another thirty days
during which the Regulators review the merger to determine whether it
will be anticompetitive.54 If the Regulators find that the merger will
have anticompetitive effects, they can seek a preliminary injunction to
stop it.55 Generally, the threat of litigation is sufficient to prevent a
proposed merger.56
However, hospitals took their pre-merger reviews to the courts,
and did so with success.57 When Regulators challenge a merger, the
first and most crucial step is defining the market.58 If the market is
improperly defined, it is impossible to quantify a merger’s effects.59
Because market definition greatly impacts the outcome of antitrust
litigation, it can be a complex, time consuming, and expensive issue to
prove.60
The relevant market is comprised of (1) the product market and
(2) the geographic market.61 Product market boundaries are defined by
“the reasonable interchangeability of use [by consumers] or the crosselasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for
it.”62 Interchangeability is based on (1) the similarity of a substitute
product to the product in question and (2) consumers’ willingness to
52

Rice, supra note 49, at 433–34.
Id. at 434.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 25 (noting that of the seven
hospital merger cases that the FTC lost from the mid-1990s to 2001, the FTC sought
to enjoin proposed mergers in six cases).
58
1 JOHN MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST L. § 2:3 (2012).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
43.
62
Id. at 45 (internal quotations omitted).
53

9
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buy the substitute product.63 Hospitals generally do not challenge
product market definitions in enforcement actions.64 The geographic
market is the “area of effective competition” where the seller operates
and to which consumers can turn for products.65 The geographic
market is a region where a monopolist could impose a price increase
without changing its terms of sale.66 In winning court battles against
the Regulators, hospitals have successfully persuaded judges to rely on
inapplicable tests to define their geographic markets.67
For example, courts frequently relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty test
to reject the Regulators’ proposed geographic market.68 The ElzingaHogarty test is premised on the idea that patient flow data will reveal
which hospitals patients in a particular geographic area can use for
their care.69 If patients within a geographic market use hospitals
outside the area, this use implies that hospitals outside the area act as
checks on the local hospital’s exercise of market power.70 Hospitals
produced evidence that more than ten percent “of patients traveled
outside the local community for care.”71 Hospitals argued that they,
therefore, faced substantial competition outside their communities.72
The problem with the Elzinga-Hogarty test is that it does not
adequately address hospital markets’ idiosyncrasies because the test
ignores patients’ insensitivity to hospital prices.73 The reason for this
lack of price sensitivity is that the third party payor shields patients

63

Id.
Rice, supra note 49, at 436.
65
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
48 (internal quotations omitted).
66
Id. at 48.
67
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 26.
68
Id. at 25.
69
Hosp. Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, ¶130–40 (1985).
70
Id.
71
Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization, supra note 38, at 3.
72
Id.
73
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 26.
64

10
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from knowing hospital service costs.74 Without this information,
patients cannot compare prices among local hospitals.75 The ElzingaHogarty test, which originally studied coal markets in 1973, does not
account for patients’ willingness to travel to hospitals based on factors
such as proximity and reputation.76 Economists watched these cases in
disbelief.77 It made little sense to rely on a test designed to study
markets for homogenous goods and apply it to hospital markets, which
are characterized by selective contracting and differentiation.78
In addition to persuading courts to rely on irrelevant market
definitions, hospitals also successfully claimed that their mergers
would exploit efficiencies, the benefits of which will be passed to
patients.79 Generally, mergers that yield cost savings are not
considered anticompetitive.80 In determining whether efficiencies
outweigh any anticompetitive effects, Regulators consider only
efficiencies that are specific to the merger.81 Because delivering care is
operationally complex, hospitals can easily show efficiencies ranging
from decreased costs in providing laboratory services to administrative
services, which can include operations as insignificant as the hospital
cafeteria.82 At one time, courts viewed this defense with suspicion, and
they would generally rule that operational efficiencies could be
realized by other means.83 However, from 1995 to 2002, this defense
became significantly more successful for hospitals with courts ruling
in their favor.84
The Regulators’ inability to stop hospital mergers has created
74

Id.
See id.
76
See Changes in Health Care Financing & Organization, supra note 38, at 3.
77
Id. at 4.
78
Id.
79
See Rice, supra note 49, at 441.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 442.
84
Id.
75
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highly concentrated markets as measured by the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (“HHI”), a measure that the Regulators themselves
use to measure market concentration.85 To calculate HHI, each firm’s
market share is squared, and the results are then summed.86 For
instance, if a firm controlled 100% of the market, the HHI would be
10,000, or 100 squared.87 On the other hand, if there were thousands of
firms in a market, each firm’s market share would be approximately
0%, resulting in an HHI measurement of 0.88
The Regulators have identified three types of markets: (1)
unconcentrated markets where HHI is below 1,500; (2) moderately
concentrated markets where HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500; and (3)
highly concentrated markets where HHI is above 2,500.89 In 1992,
hospital market concentration averaged 2,440, which is equivalent to
four equal sized firms in one market.90 In 2006, the average HHI for
hospital markets grew to 3,261, which is equivalent to three equal
sized firms per metropolitan area.91 Today, 75% of metropolitan areas
are highly concentrated.92

85

See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (Aug. 19, 2010) §5.3, available at,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (explaining that HHI
measures market concentration).
86
Id.
87
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp#axzz2AX6BbP7K (last visited Jan.
12, 2013) (explaining how HHI is calculated).
88
Id.
89
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, (Aug. 19, 2010) §5.3, available at,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
90
Gaynor, supra note 41, at 7.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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III. THE NORTHSHORE LITIGATION: FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARING TO THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The predecessor to Messner was an FTC administrative action
brought against Evanston Northwestern Health Corporation
(“EHC”).93 This case is significant for two reasons. First, until the
EHC action, the FTC had not successfully challenged a hospital
merger in over a decade.94 Second, the FTC won the case by
redefining the hospital market and using a two-tiered approach to
analyze the merger’s anticompetitive effects.95
Given the difficulty in persuading courts that hospital geographic
markets should be narrowly defined, the FTC tried a new approach in
its case against EHC.96 On January 1, 2000, EHC, which was
comprised of Glenbrook Hospital in Glenview, Illinois and Evanston
Northwestern Hospital in Evanston, Illinois, merged with Highland
Park Hospital in Highland Park, Illinois.97 EHC changed its name to
Northshore University HealthSystem (“Northshore”) after the
merger.98 In February 2004, the FTC initiated an administrative action
against Northshore and claimed that the merger violated Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.99 In Count I of its complaint, the FTC defined the
product market as “general acute care inpatient hospital services sold
to private pay[ors]” as opposed to the consumers of hospital services,
i.e., the patients.100 Under this framework, hospital competition was
analyzed under a two-tiered approach.101 The FTC argued that the first
93

Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir.
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012).
94
Rice, supra note 49, at 432.
95
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 27.
96
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
27.
97
Messner, 669 F.3d at 809.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 27.
101
Id.
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tier of competition occurs when hospitals compete to be included in
private third party payor networks.102 The second tier of competition
occurs when hospitals compete with each other for patients.103 The
FTC argued that the second tier of competition is often based on nonprice criteria such as quality of care.104 Count II focused on the
merger’s anticompetitive effects rather than the health network’s
newly formed geographic area.105 According to the FTC, the
geographic market was irrelevant in light of the merger’s
anticompetitive impact.106 The administrative law judge ruled in favor
of the FTC and ordered EHC to divest Highland Park Hospital.107
EHC appealed to the Commission.108
On appeal, the Commission determined that the merger allowed
Northshore to use its market power to increase prices.109 In reaching
this decision, the Commission focused on the hospitals’ pre-merger
business records and testimony from the creators of the ElzingaHogarty test.110 EHC had hired Bain Consulting to assist with the
merger’s strategic planning, and Bain determined that EHC would be
in a stronger position to renegotiate contracts with insurers after the
merger.111 EHC and Highland Park Hospital’s pre-merger board
minutes also included statements from their respective officers and
directors in which they concluded that the merger would allow the
new hospital network to strengthen its negotiating capabilities.112
102

Id.
Id.
104
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790, at
*16 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 2005).
105
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 27.
106
Id.
107
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 2845790, at *2.
108
Id.
109
AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 28.
110
Id. at 28, 30.
111
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
11.
112
Id. at 10–11.
103
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More significantly, the decision “downplayed the use of patient
origin data and suggested that such data will have only a limited
applicability in FTC cases going forward.”113 The Commission heard
testimony from the creators of the Elzinga-Hogarty test who testified
that the model was inapplicable to healthcare systems because patients
do not necessarily choose hospitals based on price.114 In fact, Professor
Kenneth Elzinga explained that patients “rarely fully internalize the
benefits and costs of their decision to purchase a medical product or
service.”115
Because divestiture would have been costly, the Commission
ordered independent contracting teams – one for Evanston
Northwestern Hospital and Glenbrook Hospital and a separate team
for Highland Park Hospital.116 The order required that the hospital
network set up a firewall between Highland Park and the other two
hospitals, and the negotiating teams were prohibited from sharing
information with each other.117
In April 2008, Steven Messner filed a class action suit against
Northshore.118 Other plaintiffs had filed similar actions that were
consolidated into one case, and they moved for class certification
pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3).119 The plaintiffs defined their class as
individuals and entities that purchased “inpatient hospital services or
hospital-based outpatient serviced directly from Northshore . . . from
at least as early as January 1, 2000 to the present.”120 The plaintiffs
claimed that the merger between Highland Park Hospital and EHC

113

AHLA Seminar Papers, supra note 44, at 31.
Id.
115
Id. at 31.
116
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
114

79.
117

Id.
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir.
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012).
119
Id. at 810.
120
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
118

15

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.121 Plaintiffs sought class
certification, along with injunctive relief and treble damages pursuant
to Section 4 of the Clayton Act.122
The first issue for the Seventh Circuit was whether the district
court made a procedural error in failing to subject Northshore’s expert
report to a Daubert review.123 According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, expert testimony must (1) assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue; (2) be based
on sufficient data or facts; and (3) be produced with reliable methods
that have been applied to the facts of the case.124 Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals interpreted the reliability prong to mean that an
expert’s methodology is reliable and scientifically valid if it is
grounded in the scientific method.125 Factors for reliability include
whether the technique has gained widespread acceptance, been peer
reviewed, and been published.126
The plaintiffs in Messner moved to exclude Northshore’s expert
report by arguing that the “economic analyses are fundamentally
defective.”127 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion
explaining that the report was given “the weight [the Court] believes it
[was] due.”128 The Seventh Circuit held that when an expert’s opinion
is critical to certifying a class, the district court must conduct a
Daubert review on any challenge to the expert’s submissions or
qualifications before ruling on a motion for class certification.129
The second issue was whether the district court incorrectly
applied the predominance requirement with respect to antitrust impact

121

Id. at 808; 15 U.S.C. § 18.
Messner, 669 F.3d at 808 (internal quotations omitted); 15 U.S.C. §15.
123
Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.
124
FED. R. EVID. 702.
125
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–3 (1993).
126
Id. at 593.
127
Messner, 669 F.3d at 812 (internal quotations omitted).
128
Id.
129
Id.
122
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or “fact of damage.”130 To become certified under FRCP 23(a), a class
must show (1) numerosity, (2) commonality in questions of law or
fact, (3) typicality of claims among the representatives, and (4) that
“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”131 A proposed class must always satisfy the
FRCP 23(a) requirements before seeking certification pursuant to
FRCP 23(b)(3).132 In order to certify a class under FRCP 23(b)(3), the
court must find “that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”133 FRCP
23(b)’s predominance requirement is satisfied when common
questions representing “a significant aspect of a case . . . can be
resolved for all members of a class in a single adjudication.”134
The first step in a predominance analysis is for the court to
examine the underlying elements of the cause of action.135 In antitrust
cases, plaintiffs must show that (1) the defendant violated an antitrust
law and that (2) the violation caused an injury.136 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with the district court as to how far the plaintiffs needed to
go to show predominance with respect to antitrust injury, also known
as antitrust impact, at the class certification stage.137
To demonstrate antitrust impact, plaintiffs relied on a “difference
in differences” analysis (“DID analysis”).138 DID analyses are useful
tools for studying the effects of mergers because such analyses
compare prices before a given event, in this case a merger, to prices

130

Id. at 814.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
132
Messner, 699 F.3d at 811.
133
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
134
Messner, 699 at 815 (internal quotations omitted).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
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Id. at 808.
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after the event.139 The analysis controls for other economic factors that
may cause prices to change by first identifying other products or
geographic markets in which economic factors other than the merger
itself caused price changes.140 The merger’s effect is quantified by
comparing the “control group’s” price changes to the subject
hospital’s prices changes before and after the merger.141 Plaintiff’s
expert was Northwestern University economist, Dr. David Dranove
(“Dranove”).142 His DID analysis compared the percentage increase in
prices for services after the merger to those of a control group,
consisting of local hospitals that were subject to the same market
forces as Northshore.143 The district court declined to certify plaintiffs’
class because it concluded that the expert’s analysis needed to show
that prices increased uniformly.144 Due to a lack of uniform prices
charged to payors, the district court held that the plaintiffs could not
show predominance and denied class certification.145
The district court focused on the fact that hospitals charge payors
different prices.146 For instance, prices for insurers that negotiate
multi-year contracts for services may differ from those that renegotiate
each year.147 Moreover, insurers will negotiate contracts that cover
bundles of services.148 For example, a bill for a Caesarian section
could include “anesthesia, operating room use, surgeon’s fee, postoperative care for the mother, newborn care for the baby, etc.”149
Hospitals may unbundle and re-bundle these services so that two
139

See Graeme Hunter, Gregory K. Leonard & G. Steven Olley, Merger
Retrospective: A Review, 23 NO. 1 ANTITRUST MAGAZINE 34, 35 (2008).
140
Messner, 699 F.3d at 810.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 810.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 817–18.
145
Id. at 818.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 818.
148
Id. at 816.
149
Id.
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purchasers pay different amounts for the same Caesarian section.150
Furthermore, the market prices of each individual component can vary
depending on the standard of care and advances in technology.151 In
particular, the district court focused on data in Dranove’s reply report
detailing increases in prices for “Payor A.”152 In denying class
certification, the district court judge asserted that “of the 18 prices
listed in [Payor A’s] renegotiated September 22, 2002 contract, 6
increased at a uniform rate, 9 increased at variable rates, and 3
changed pricing methodologies from the previous contract, making it
difficult to draw a comparison.”153
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court misapplied Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance standard because it required a test that was
too stringent at the class certification stage.154 The Court explained
that the ability to use “common evidence and common methodology to
prove a class’s claims is sufficient to support a finding of
predominance on the issue of antitrust impact for certification under
Rule 23(b)(3).”155 Dranove claimed the he could use post merger price
increases, which would constitute common evidence, to show that
“insurers and individuals who received coverage through those
insurers suffered some antitrust injury” caused by the merger.156
Dranove further explained that he could adapt his methodology
whenever price increases varied by conducting as many DID analyses
as were required when the price increases were non-uniform.157 “In
this way, Dranove explained, he would be able to calculate ‘different

150

Id.
Id.
152
Id. at 821.
153
Id. at 821 (citing Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
268 F.R.D. 56, 86 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).
154
Id. at 818.
155
Id. at 819.
156
Id. at 818.
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Id. at 820.
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overcharges across different services categories’ despite any nonuniform increase in the prices charged for those services.”158
For instance, the Court examined prices from 2000 and 2002 and
noted that “[t]he prices for eight categories of inpatient services all
increased by approximately 6.0 percent.”159 During the same period,
the price structure remained unchanged for two categories of
outpatient services while a third category changed its price structure
“from a flat rate per case to a percentage of the billed charges.”160
Further, the Court examined price variations in cardiac services across
nine sub-categories.161 Prices for five subcategories decreased between
9.3% and 13.0%; two subcategories increased 14.8% and 60%,
respectively; and two subcategories changed their billing structure.162
On their face, prices for cardiac services appeared to decrease;
however, a closer examination revealed that prices from 2000 included
the physicians’ services whereas the 2002 prices did not.163 The Court
believed that “[t]hese superficially non-uniform changes in prices
therefore merely pose the sort of manageable challenge that Dranove's
methodology can handle, [and] [t]hey do not undermine the
methodology itself.”164
The third issue was whether the class was defined
appropriately.165 Northshore argued that the class contained
individuals “who were not injured by Northshore’s alleged exercise of
market power.”166 For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois had
submitted an affidavit stating that it was not affected by post merger
price increases.167 The class also included individuals who “met their
158

Id. at 820–21.
Id. at 821.
160
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 821–22.
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Id. at 822.
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annual plan out-of-pocket maximum or their deductible regardless of
any price increase, as well as those individuals whose contracts
protect[] against price increases.” 168 The Court stated that defining a
class in such a way as to avoid being over and under-inclusive “is
more of an art than a science.”169 Because Northshore failed to specify
the number of individuals in the class that could not have been harmed
by the merger and only 2.4% of the class actually “paid only their outof-pocket maximums or deductibles,” Northshore failed to show that
the class was overbroad.170 The Seventh Circuit vacated the district
court’s order and certified the class.171
IV. MESSNER’S IMPACT
The purpose of antitrust laws is to eliminate anticompetitive
practices and promote a competitive economy in which enterprises
compete on the basis of service, quality, and price.172 The undesirable
effects of hospital consolidation combined with the fact that the
Commission’s civil penalty against EHC was considered a mere “slap
on the wrist” seriously undermines competition and quality of care.173
For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Messner has
important consequences in that it provides a framework for how other
hospital antitrust class actions can become certified. Whether Messner
will actually deter anticompetitive conduct depends on (1) the effect of
the Court’s Daubert ruling, (2) current trends in class action litigation,
and (3) private payors initiating these actions. If Messner has no
deterrent effect, the Regulators alone will police hospitals.
168

Id. at 824 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 825.
170
Id. at 825–86.
171
Id. at 826.
172
Philip A. Proger, Primer on Antitrust in Healthcare, AHLA-PAPERS
P05170101, 2 (2001).
173
Telephone Interview with Dr. David Dranove, Professor of Health Industry
Management, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (Oct. 15,
2012) [hereinafter Dranove Interview].
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A. The Effect of the Daubert Ruling
At first blush, the Seventh Circuit’s Daubert ruling appears to
impose another hurdle for class certification. However, I argue that the
absence of a Daubert challenge to the plaintiff’s DID analysis
provides a framework for future antitrust class actions involving
hospital mergers, which currently are extremely rare.174 According to a
2002 study of trends in antitrust healthcare litigation, solo or small
group physician practices were the largest plaintiff group by far,
accounting for 53% of all plaintiffs, and hospitals constituted the
largest defendant pool, accounting for 61% of all defendants.175 These
cases mostly concern disputes over staff privileges.176 Because
Messner is such a unique case, it paves the way for other cases that
challenge hospital monopolies to become certified in light of the
complex analyses that courts undertake in ruling on Rule 23 motions.
In deciding whether to certify a class, Rule 23 requires courts to
walk a fine line – particularly in cases like Messner where the
plaintiffs rely on expert testimony. Demonstrating common impact in
class actions is a complex task, and yet, it is important that class
certification not be turned into a trial on the merits.177 The question of
whether to grant certification is a procedural one, in which plaintiffs
need only show that they can use common evidence to prove their
claims after certification.178 Because of these requirements, factfinding is generally necessary to address issues pertaining to the
plaintiff’s proposed methodology.179 But defendants often attempt to
turn certification into a trial on the merits by asking the court to

174

Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and
the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 570 (2002).
175
Id. at 566.
176
Id. at 568.
177
Ellen Meriwether, Rigorous Analysis in Certification of Antitrust Class
Actions: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 21–SUM ANTITRUST 55, 55 (2007).
178
Id.
179
Id.
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perform “a rigorous Rule 23 analysis.”180 These tactics usurp the
jury’s role in resolving questions of fact.181 In Amchem Products Inc.
v. Windsor, the Supreme Court noted that “no reading of Rule 23 can
ignore the Rules Enabling Act's mandate that ‘rules of procedure shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”’182 Therefore,
questions pertaining to antitrust impact should be for the jury at trial,
not the judge in ruling on a motion to certify.183 Nonetheless,
determining whether to certify a class may require courts to consider
the merits because the legal issues surrounding Rule 23 are often
enmeshed with factual questions.184
Reconciling these concepts—avoiding fact-finding while
determining whether Rule 23 requirements are met—is a muddy
process in antitrust cases.185 The major issue in certifying an antirust
class action is predominance, or antitrust injury, which is proven by
running common evidence through an economic model to show how
the defendant’s conduct impacted prices.186 At the same time, that
economic model can refute the notion that common impact exists.187
Because this approach would violate the Rules Enabling Act, most
courts require only that plaintiffs be able to prove their case with
common evidence.188
The tension between satisfying Rule 23 and avoiding fact-finding
has caused disagreement among circuit courts as to how rigorously
expert witness testimony should be scrutinized at the class certification

180

Id.
Id.
182
Id. (citing Anchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)
(internal quotations omitted)).
183
Id. at 55.
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Id. at 56–57.
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Id. at 57.
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stage.189 In Behrend v. Comcast Corporation, the Supreme Court is
currently deciding whether expert testimony should undergo a Daubert
review at the class certification stage.190 In American Honda Motor
Company v. Allen the Seventh Circuit held that a Daubert review is
necessary whenever there is a challenge to expert testimony that is
critical to class certification,191 and the Court again reinforced this
ruling in Messner.192 However, not all courts follow this approach.193
In refraining from dealing with “battles of the experts” during class
certification, some courts hold that plaintiffs only need offer a valid
method that they can use to prove common impact.194 While these
courts are more deferential to experts and scrutinize their findings less,
they are becoming a rarity.195 For instance, the Third Circuit, a court
formerly known for being certification friendly, recently began
requiring more rigorous scrutiny of expert testimony for class
certification.196 In In re: Hydrogen Peroxide, the Third Circuit held
189

See Stephen Mahle, BUSINESS LITIGATION IN FLORIDA §13.48 (7th ed.
2012) (discussing the circuits where a Daubert review is required at the class
certification stage when the opposing party challenges expert testimony).
190
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. granted in
part, 133 S. Ct. 24 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
191
Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2010).
192
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir.
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012). See also Bruce D. Sokler, et al., Antitrust and
Class Action Advisory (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2012/Advisories/1611-0112-NATAFR/index.htm.
193
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes declined to rule on
whether Daubert applied to expert testimony at the class certification stage. 131
S.Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011). However, the Court strongly hinted that it did. Id.
194
Donald Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous Analysis of Economic
Evidence on Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 24–FALL ANTITRUST 55, 55-56
(2009).
195
See id. at 55 (noting that a majority of “federal courts of appeals no longer
follow[] this deferential approach but now require[] a rigorous assessment of expert
evidence and merits-related issues, supported by findings of fact to explain why class
certification is or is not warranted”).
196
Id.
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that in determining whether to certify a class, each requirement of
Rule 23 must be satisfied, and courts cannot merely rely on a
“threshold showing” by a party.197 In addition, the Third Circuit
explained that it must also “resolve all factual or legal disputes
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits—
including disputes touching on elements of the cause of action.”198
Even if the Supreme Court adopts the Seventh Circuit’s
requirement for a Daubert review, such a ruling will not prevent
hospital antitrust classes that rely on DID analyses from becoming
certified. Indeed, expert testimony can be critical in motions to certify
antitrust class actions. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that antitrust impact
is capable of proof at trial, and this demonstration often involves an
economic construct that establishes the defendant’s abuse of market
power.199 Though a Daubert review is the most stringent review for an
expert’s methodology, DID analyses pass Daubert reviews with flying
colors.
For economic models to withstand Daubert review, the expert
who created them must rely on a methodology that is scientifically
valid, an indicia of which is widespread acceptance.200 Though not
much has been written about DID analyses in legal scholarship, this
methodology has gained widespread acceptance as evidenced by the
use of DID analyses throughout the EHC litigation. During the
administrative action, both the FTC and EHC relied on DID analyses
without any Daubert challenges on either side.201 While the FTC does
not abide by the rules of evidence in its hearings, the Commission
does follow “the spirit of Daubert” in determining expert testimony

197

In re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id.
199
Interview with Hal Morris, Partner, Arnstein & Lehr, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct.
25, 2012).
200
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–3 (1993).
201
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at
24; Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790 (F.T.C.
Oct. 20, 2005).
198

25

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

admissibility.202 Admittedly, an administrative agency’s use of a
particular methodology does not necessarily mean that the federal
courts will accept it,203 but it does indicate that the methodology is
widely accepted. Furthermore, if Dranove’s DID analysis were truly
flawed, Northshore would have challenged it204—just as the plaintiffs
challenged Northshore’s expert report.205
In addition to being widely used, DID analyses are very powerful
in that they can control for other causes for price increase when
studying a merger’s effects.206 This attribute lends credence to the
methodology’s reliability. For instance, in the EHC litigation, the FTC
identified ten factors, including the merger, that could account for
EHC’s price increases.207 These other factors were:
(1) Overall increases in costs that affected other Chicago-area
hospitals;
(2) Changes in regulation;
(3) Increases in demand;
(4) Increases in quality at EHC above that of other Chicago area
hospitals;
(5) Changes in the complexity of patient cases;
(6) Changes in payment mix;
(7) Increases in teaching intensity;
202

In the Matter of Telebrands Corp., TV Sav., LLC, and Ajit Khubani, 140
F.T.C. 278, 346 n.32 (2005).
203
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 153 (1997) (J. Stevens
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (where expert testimony that relied on the
same methodology that the Environmental Protection Agency used was
inadmissible).
204
See, e.g., In re: Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3rd.
Cir. 2008) (noting that a “court's obligation to consider all relevant evidence and
arguments extends to expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class
certification or by a party opposing it”).
205
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir.
2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2012).
206
See Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note
6, at 22 (relying on a DID analysis to control for other causes of price increases).
207
Id.
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(8) Decreases in prices charged for outpatient services to managed
care organizations;
(9) EHC learning about demand for services from Highland Park
Hospital’s pricing data;
(10) Increases in market power resulting from the merger.208
The FTC’s expert concluded that the first three causes for price
increases were benign, and the expert then created three control groups
based on these benign factors for her DID analyses.209 With these
control groups, the expert quantified the impact of the benign factors
on prices.210 The expert then performed another DID analysis to
determine whether patient mix, customer mix, and teaching intensity,
factors five through seven, could have caused the price increases at
EHC.211 The expert concluded that these factors differed significantly
between the control group and EHC, meaning that the control group
could not be used to quantify these factors’ effects.212 The expert then
performed a linear regression analysis that compared factors five
through seven to Illinois payor data.213 After quantifying the effect of
factors five through seven via the regression analysis, the expert then
concluded that any post-merger price increases that could not be
explained by factors one through seven resulted from EHC’s market
power.214
Given the power of DID analyses to control for benign variables
that influence prices and its widespread use, a properly performed DID
analysis can easily satisfy Daubert’s reliability prong. Even if the
Supreme Court decides that Daubert reviews are required at class
certification, such a ruling will not deter hospital antitrust suits. But,
despite the existence of a sound model for quantifying monopolistic
208

Id.
Id. at 24.
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Id. at 26.
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practices, future anticompetitive conduct will only be deterred if cases
are brought against those who engage in these illegal practices.
B. Trends in Class Action Litigation and the Role of the Private
Payor in Vindicating Rights
Antitrust law provides a private right of action with harsh
monetary penalties to incentivize private attorneys to litigate for the
public good215 and serve various other public policy purposes such as
compensation, deterrence, and supplementation of the government
action.216 Private antitrust suits are also often litigated as class actions
because individual consumers may suffer only a small amount of
damages when a violator unlawfully abuses its market power.217
Without the class action mechanism, consumers would abandon their
claims because litigation would not be worth their while.218 However,
settlement, management turnover, and insurers’ apathy toward
monopoly pricing frustrate antitrust law’s public policy goals.
1. Settlement: Thwarting Compensation and Deterrence
Private antitrust remedies compensate plaintiffs for both the
injuries they suffer and the cost of litigation, and they deter
anticompetitive conduct by making monopolistic practices less
profitable.219 Prevailing plaintiffs in antitrust suits receive attorneys’
fees and treble damages, in the amount equal to three times
damages.220 Treble damages compensate victims who must expend

215

Meriwether, supra note 177, at 56.
Crane, supra note 13, at 678.
217
Christopher Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in
Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2008).
218
Id.
219
Leslie, supra note 217, at 1010.
220
15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West).
216
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enormous resources to hire expert witnesses.221 For instance, a DID
analysis costs upwards of five hundred thousand dollars.222 Yet it is
impossible to fully comprehend the deterrent and compensatory
impact of antitrust class actions without understanding the effect of
settlement. One particularly important aspect of settlement is that
despite treble damages being mandatory, federal judges generally
refuse to treble antitrust settlements.223 The reason for this approach is
that treble damages imply fault whereas settlement does not, and
settlement negotiations exempt defendants from conceding guilt.224
Class actions’ effectiveness as a means to enforce antitrust law
becomes suspect if class counsel rushes to settle to ensure significant
payouts for the attorneys while considerably under compensating the
class.225 These collusive settlements undermine “the deterrent effect of
private lawsuits and, consequently, of antitrust laws more broadly.”226
In an effort to curb these practices, Congress required federal judicial
approval of class action settlements.227 Nevertheless, even this safety
net is inadequate because reviewing judges refuse to treble antitrust
damages when suits are settled, and the settlement rate is high in
antitrust class actions.228 Therefore, the threat of treble damages is
minimized, and antitrust deterrence and compensation are less
effective.229
While settlement alleviates some of the risk for plaintiffs given
the complexity and drawn-out nature of antitrust litigation, the
majority of settlements deny antitrust victims full recovery of the
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damages they suffered.230 Class actions suffer from classic agency
problems because class counsel controls the settlement process and
class members generally do not monitor their case.231 The disconnect
between counsel and the clients benefits the defendant, who aims to
minimize expenditures and includes litigation costs in its payment to
the class.232 Defendants are also indifferent to the allocation of the
payout between class and counsel.233 Therefore, settlement
negotiations provide class counsel “an opportunity to entice
defendants to reduce their total payments by providing counsel with
generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the class.”234
Hence, settlements deny class members their legal remedies, fail to
disgorge the defendant’s ill-gotten gains, and potentially render
antitrust class actions a mere cost of doing business.235
2. Hospital Management Passes the Buck
For private antitrust litigation to serve its deterrent purpose, the
plaintiffs’ remedies also must directly impact the individuals within
hospitals who engage in anticompetitive conduct.236 Unfortunately, the
individuals who have the authority to approve a hospital merger are in
upper-level management, and private antitrust litigation often outlasts
the tenure of a hospital CEO.237 In short, turnover thwarts the deterrent
objective because upper level management does not internalize the
effects of an antitrust judgment.238
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The average time to dispose of a civil case in federal court was
18.5 months in 1996, and it increased to 24.6 months in 2007.239
Because of the complexities of antitrust litigation, these cases are
undoubtedly litigated for longer periods of time than others.240 For
instance, in 2007, 378 federal antitrust cases had been pending for
more than three years.241 Based on these numbers, the estimated length
of time from planning anticompetitive conduct to payment of a
substantial settlement exceeds five years.242 At the same time, the
average tenure of a hospital CEO is 3.8 years.243
Compounding the problem is the fact that C-suite pay at a health
system is approximately 40% more than at an independent hospital.244
Such a large difference in pay indicates that there are strong incentives
for upper-level management to grow a hospital, and the easiest way to
grow an organization is through consolidation. There is also little
evidence to suggest that an antitrust judgment could harm a manager’s
reputation because the decision to engage in anticompetitive conduct
is often a collective one.245 Therefore, it is difficult to pin the blame on
one individual.246
On the other hand, upper level management is not completely
unscathed by antitrust litigation. For one, these lawsuits are expensive
and time consuming, and defendants disproportionately bear the
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costs.247 CEOs and CFOs also care greatly about containing legal
fees,248 and becoming embroiled in a lawsuit that could take years to
resolve is not ideal from a cost perspective. Settlement can also
accelerate payouts, but these settlements generally occur on the eve of
trial unless the case is a government tag along.249
When management conduct brings increases in profits with only
potential future liabilities, managers tend to choose immediate profits
because they apply a discount to any future judgment.250 This is a
financial concept known as the time value of money, where money
today is worth more than money in the future. Additionally, the longer
it takes to pay money out, the less its present value is worth. Given
that the incentives to engage in anticompetitive behavior for shortterm gains outweigh the remote probability of being held accountable,
managers will discount the threat of litigation.251 Hence, deterrence
fails.
3. Private Insurers’ Role in Supplementing Government Enforcement
Actions
Private antitrust litigation supplements government action because
the government lacks the recourses to detect and prosecute all
anticompetitive conduct.252 Detecting hospitals’ anticompetitive
conduct is difficult, and only insurers are in a position to do so. Due to
the complexities and lack of transparency associated with hospital
billing, it is impossible for individual patients to know when they pay
for monopoly-priced services.253 Because insurers negotiate service
247
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contracts with numerous hospitals, only they have the ability to
compare price increases among providers within a market. By tracking
price data, insurers can detect monopolistic activity even if there has
been no government enforcement action. And indeed, insurers do
monitor the cost of services closely. In the administrative hearing,
insurers testified that EHC’s newly formed hospital network had more
bargaining power, and contracting managers testified that the hospital
network commanded substantial price increases post-merger.254
However, there is no evidence to suggest that insurers are willing
to sue providers,255 and they must be willing to do so to act as an
effective market check. Because demand for health insurance is
inelastic, meaning that an increase in price will not necessarily change
demand,256 insurers are in a position to pass the cost of monopoly
priced services to their customers. Therefore, insurers are not
incentivized to bring antitrust suits. Increasing prices for consumers is
much easier than becoming involved in expensive and time-consuming
antitrust cases against hospitals. While insurers will express concern
about a hospital’s anticompetitive conduct to Regulators, they prefer to
maintain productive relationships with providers.257
The history of the Messner case is a perfect example of insurers’
unwillingness to participate in antitrust actions. In the administrative
hearing, the FTC’s expert found that EHC increased prices for Aetna,
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Humana, United, and Great West anywhere from 21.3% to 93.2%,258
and yet, none of these insurers participated in Messner.259 Given
insurers’ unwillingness to bring these cases, the ruling in Messner is
unlikely to spur private antitrust suits absent a prior government
enforcement action.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Regulator’s role in monitoring and prosecuting
anticompetitive conduct will become increasingly important as the
ACA continues to prompt an unprecedented number of mergers.
Unless insurers are forced to change either their contracting processes
or their models for charging premiums, they will continue to be an
ineffective market check. With enhanced market power, management
at these newly formed hospital networks and ACOs will be tempted to
leverage their negotiating power to increase revenues. The temptation
to charge monopolistic prices will be particularly strong if Medicare
reimbursement rates continue to decline (a likely scenario), and
management is forced to rely on service contracts with private payors
to increase revenues.
However, if management does not temper its desire for higher
profits, there will be consequences for hospitals. Should providers fail
to produce better care coordination and lower healthcare costs, they
will find themselves under immense political pressure and scrutiny to
do so. Regulators, armed with a new approach to define hospital
product markets, will conduct post-merger reviews and bring
enforcement actions if necessary. At the very least, Messner provides a
framework for future government tag along class actions. Though
class actions cannot deter all of management’s anticompetitive

258

Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Commission Decision, supra note 6, at

21.
259

See Complaint at 3, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation
Antitrust Litigation, 2008 WL 4962356 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 07-CV-4446)
(plaintiffs listed in the most recent complaint include two individuals, a small Illinois
corporation, and a union benefit plan).

34

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/2

34

Bacallao: <em>Messner</em>'s Effect on Hospital Consolidation and Anticompe

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

conduct, Messner will have some deterrent effect given that it will
prompt hospital management to reassess its litigation risks.260

260

Crane, supra note 13, at 697 n.103 (noting that deterrence is most effective
among the targeted firm’s competitors).
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